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Outline
• Previous contributions on vertical integration (VI) in electricity:
– Hogan and Meade (2007) – VI gentailers with balanced supply and load 
have no incentive to manipulate wholesale prices, while separated 
generators always price above cost
– Meade and O’Connor (2009, 2010) – VI resolves contracting problems, 
and is superior to separation in terms of supporting retail competition and 
investment
• Just completed Masters degree at Toulouse School of Economics 
(TSE), with thesis formally modeling welfare consequences of VI 
– working paper version of the thesis is called:
Vertical Integration vs Vertical Separation in an Imperfectly 
Competitive Industry, such as Electricity, with Retail, Wholesale 
and Forward Markets
• Tonight’s seminar is the 40 minute version of the 15 minute thesis 
defence …
Background
Background – TSE
Background – TSE (cont’d)
Background – TSE (cont’d)
• Unsettled question in electricity reforms:
Is vertical integration between generators and retailers 
good or bad, given its impacts on retail, wholesale and 
forward markets?
• Separation often mandated/required as part of reforms
• Endogenous rise of VI often viewed with suspicion  e.g. 
Wolak (2009) study for ComCom
• Some jurisdictions unwind VI through regulated contract 
sales  e.g. NZ regulations
• “My paper is the first to formally address this question, from 
a theoretical welfare perspective, in an oligopoly model with 
endogenous integration, and with a forward market”
Motivation
• Some authors model imperfect competition in 
upstream and downstream industries, e.g.:
– Salinger (1988) – imposes level of VI, and no clear finding on 
welfare impacts
– Gaudet and Van Long (1996) – assume firms choose whether 
to integrate/separate, but no welfare analysis
– Neither allow for forward contracting
• Others model electricity with forward and wholesale 
markets, but without clear retail competition, e.g.:
– Powell (1993) – shows that retailers can use forward contracts 
to constrain generator market power
– Green (2004) – generators sell less energy forward when 
retailing is more competitive
– Both allow for only two generators, and neither considers 
welfare
Related literature
• Aïd et al. (2009) model an electricity sector with 
forward, wholesale and spot markets:
– Assume perfect competition
– Focus on hedging (rather than strategic) motives for VI and 
contracting  opposite of my paper’s strategic focus only
– Find VI and contracting are imperfect substitutes for risk 
management
– Only partial welfare analysis
• Allaz and Vila (1993) – the classic paper on forward 
contracting in a two firm industry:
– Ignore VI
– Contracts are bought by speculators rather than industry 
participants
– Firms sell forward even though this toughens competition in 
the wholesale market and lowers profits
Related literature (cont’d)
• Static, deterministic setting with full information
• No spatial considerations (e.g. no grid congestion) or capacity 
constraints
• Homogenous good – e.g. electricity – with linear retail inverse 
demand
• Imperfectly competitive (i.e. “oligopolistic”) industry:
– ng generators
– nr retailers
• No costs of generation, or of retailing (other than energy 
purchase costs)  convenient, and should leave strategic stories 
unchanged
• Generators choose whether to integrate or separate, and do so 
irrespective of scale differences between generators and retailers
Model setup – Assumptions
m vertically integrated (with m endogenous)
Separated Generators 
Separated Retailers 
Retailing
Generation
Integrated Firms 
Forward
Wholesale
Retail
Model setup – Institutional setting
Time
Generators decide whether or not to integrate or to 
separate
Generators compete in quantities to supply forward 
contracts
Generators compete in quantities to supply wholesale 
demand
Retailers compete in quantities to supply retail demand
Production
Stage III
Contracting
Stage II
Integration
Stage I
Model setup – Timing
Retailers determine their demand for forward contracts
Model setup – A taste of the results …
In equilibrium, wholesale price can be shown to be …
• Vertical integration is superior to separation:
– Two key welfare measures - Total surplus and Consumer 
surplus – increase as the level of integration rises
– Retail price falls as the level of integration rises
• “Four is enough” – with four or more generators there are 
diminishing returns from adding extra generators:
– Total surplus attains almost first best levels
– Consumer surplus attains almost maximal levels
• Full integration is a form of “synthetic generation” – i.e. is 
comparable in welfare terms to having one extra generator 
under full separation
• In the case with two generators, full VI is the only choice of 
generators (even though this can result in lower profits)
Key results
Key results – Total surplus
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Key results – Retail price
1
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
.1
0
.2
0
.3
0
.4
0
.5
0
.6
0
.7
ng 1
m ng
R
e
ta
il 
P
ri
c
e
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
.1
0
.2
0
.3
0
.4
0
.5
0
.6
0
.7
ng 2
m ng
R
e
ta
il 
P
ri
c
e
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
6
6 6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
.1
0
.2
0
.3
0
.4
0
.5
0
.6
0
.7
ng 3
m ng
R
e
ta
il 
P
ri
c
e
3
3
3 3
4
4
4 4
5
5 5 5
6
6 6 6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
.1
0
.2
0
.3
0
.4
0
.5
0
.6
0
.7
ng 4
m ng
R
e
ta
il 
P
ri
c
e
4
4 4 4 4
5
5 5 5 5
6
6 6 6 6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
.1
0
.2
0
.3
0
.4
0
.5
0
.6
0
.7
ng 5
m ng
R
e
ta
il 
P
ri
c
e
5
5 5 5 5 5
6
6 6 6 6 6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
.1
0
.2
0
.3
0
.4
0
.5
0
.6
0
.7
ng 6
m ng
R
e
ta
il 
P
ri
c
e
6
6 6 6 6 6 6
Key results – Industry profits
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• Monopoly generation is unusual case:
– Full integration raises Total (and Consumer) 
surplus while lowering retail price
– It does this despite wiping out independent 
retailing, increasing profit, and increasing retail 
market concentration
• Duopoly generation (i.e. two generators) is also 
quirky:
– Retail concentration is often higher under partial 
integration than under either full separation or full 
integration
– But welfare is still increasing with integration
Key results – Contradictions
• Gaudet and Van Long model only integration and 
production stages
• They find:
– Integrated firms “raise rivals’ costs” – i.e. purchase wholesale 
energy to increase wholesale price and hence raise separated 
retailers’ input cost
– Strategy works provided number of separated retailers is large 
relative to number of integrated firms (so profits from reduced 
retail competition outweigh cost of buying at greater than own 
production cost)
– Firms’ integration choice: either full integration (nr = 2, 3), 
partial integration (nr = 4), or full separation (nr ≥ 5)
Key results – Strategic interactions
• Adding a forward market, I find both “raising rivals’ costs” 
and an additional and countervailing “over-buy and recycle” 
strategy of separated retailers:
– They actively buy forward to pre-commit generators to supply, 
thereby toughening wholesale competition and restraining 
wholesale price
– In fact they forward buy more than their retail supply 
commitment, and sell their excess to generators on the 
wholesale market
– Hence, to protect themselves, generators must integrate
• This extra strategy underlies my finding that full integration 
is the only outcome in a model with forward trading
Key results – Strategic interactions (cont’d)
Key results – VI firm wholesale output
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Key results – Total wholesale demand
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• Deeper analysis of existing model (e.g. solve Stage I for 
more than two generators)
• Numerous technical improvements possible – e.g. 
modeling costs, capacity constraints, etc
• More material innovations:
– Introduce uncertainty (e.g. re demand and/or costs)
– Introduce asymmetric information (e.g. re costs)
• Main future direction:
– Model entry and investment in multi-period context
– Test hypothesis of Meade and O’Connor (2010) that excessive 
retail entry curtails investment because it creates retail – and 
hence wholesale – hold-up risks, with VI predicted to be more 
robust than (i.e. superior to) separation
Extensions
• Within the limitations of the model’s assumptions, some clear messages 
emerge for regulators, competition authorities and policymakers
• Vertical integration offers welfare benefits over vertical separation in an 
imperfectly competitive industry comprising forward, wholesale and retail 
markets
• Although integration is predicted to emerge naturally as a consequence 
of generator decisions, this does not mean consumers suffer (the 
reverse is true)
• While integrated firms can indeed engage in apparently anti-competitive 
strategies (“raising rivals’ costs”), consumers are still better off under 
integration
• Although imperfectly competitive generators are often seen as villains, in 
fact they can fall victim to retailers’ forward market strategies 
(“overbuying and recycling”)
• Integration can substitute for structural reform (“synthetic generation”) 
and lowers the optimal number of generators (“four is enough”)
Conclusions
Thank you – any questions?
